哲学会饮

25 Sep/ 9月25日
DING Yifeng丁一峰, Julius Schönherr, Sebastian Sunday Grève
Q&A on Applying for Graduate Study Abroad

This session is for all students who may want to apply for graduate study in philosophy abroad. It will be useful for students at all levels.Topics covered will include early preparation, including course choice, as well as school selection and preparation of application materials (writing sample, recommendation letters, etc.).After a brief introduction, the three teachers will answer student questions.The presentation will be in English.

9 Oct / 10月9日
Tian Haoyu 田浩宇
Reason-Responsiveness Theories Cannot Survive the Attack of Situationism

Chair主持嘉宾：南星 Nan Xing
Abstract: This paper challenges reason-responsiveness theories (RRT) of moral responsibility by examining the threat posed by situationism. RRT holds that moral responsibility depends on an agent's ability to recognize and respond to reasons. However, situationist experiments show that minor situational factors often influence ordinary behavior in ways that undermine reason-responsiveness. The paper critiques John Fischer's version of RRT, identifying the empirical applicability problem (EAP) and the Irrelevance Challenge, which highlight the disconnect between RRT's theoretical claims and real-world behavior. Further possible defense from RRT, especially a kind of Modal Response, is considered and refuted. I conclude that RRT cannot adequately address the situationist threat and suggests a need for a forward-looking revision of responsibility theory.本次报告将以英文进行，以下是中文版题目和摘要：标题：理由反应理论无法抵御情境主义的攻击
摘要：本文通过考察情境主义所带来的威胁，挑战了关于道德责任的理由反应理论。理由反应理论认为，道德责任取决于个体识别和响应理由的能力。然而，情境主义的实验表明，微小的情境因素往往会削弱个体在进行日常行为时的理由反应能力。本文批判了约翰·费舍尔版本的理由反应理论，指出了理论的“经验适用性问题”和“无关性挑战”，这两个问题强调了理由响应理论对人类行动的预测与现实行为之间的脱节。文章还讨论了理由反应理论可能的进一步辩护，尤其是“模态回应”，并对此进行了反驳。最后，我得出结论认为，理由反应理论无法充分应对情境主义的威胁，表明我们需要对责任理论进行前瞻性修正。

13 Mar/ 3月13日
Xinkan Zhao 赵新侃
'Reasons Internalism Based on Reasoning '

Chair主持嘉宾: Han Linhe（韩林合）Title: Reasons Internalism Based on ReasoningReasons internalists think that whether one has reason to do something is constrained by what motivational set one has; in other words, for any action, as long as the agent's motivational set is peculiar enough, he would have no reason to perform that action. To prevent the thesis from being a mere claim, some internalists start to construct more explicit arguments. One of them is Manne's argument from reasoning, which will be the target of this round of discussion.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：基于说理的理由内在主义
摘要：理由内在主义者认为，一个人是否有理由做某事受到他有着何种驱动集的约束；换言之，对任意一件事而言，只要行动者的驱动集足够独特，他就没有理由做这件事。为了让理由内在主义不仅仅流于断言形式，一些内在主义者开始为之构造更为明晰的论证，其中之一是曼恩基于说理的论证，它也将是本次讨论的对象。

27Mar/ 3月27日
Yifan Song 宋一凡
'The Multiple Faces of “Power”: From Spinoza to the Contemporary Critical Theory '

Chair主持嘉宾: Haifeng Yang (仰海峰)Spinoza's philosophy has undergone a complete renaissance in the contemporary context, of which the radical left plays an important role. Antonio Negri has shaped it into an ontology of power, a dualistic struggle of ever-becoming power (potentia) against repressive power (potestas). This ontology is the fundamental guarantee of the emancipatory character of the popular movement. The purity of the power that rejects any institutional mediation or contingency, and that gives rise to the political form of "radical democracy". But in fact, the relationship between potentia and potestas in Spinoza's philosophy is highly complex. From Ethics to Political Treatise, Spinoza questions the nature of power: potestas is not in itself opposed to potentia, but rather it is a realised, crystallised power. This power more or less has an orientation and is more or less controllable, which constitutes an extension of potentia. It can be said, there is no such a thing as purely “wild” power. Reconfiguring the inter relations of power and deciphering its different faces helps us to reflect on the ontological bases of the contemporary radical left and to explore a new interface between Spinoza and the critical social theory represented by Marx. Power in itself is immanent, but it always undergoes a complex and lengthy metamorphosis.本次报告将用中文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。“权力”的多重面孔——从斯宾诺莎到当代批判理论斯宾诺莎哲学在当代语境中得到了全面复兴，其中激进左翼是重要的来源。A.奈格里将其形塑为一种力量的本体论，一种由生生不息的力量（Potentia）反抗压制性的权力（Potestas）的二元斗争。这种本体论是大众运动具备解放性的根本保障，力量的纯粹性使其拒绝任何机制性的中介和偶然性，也正由此才产生了“激进民主”的政治形式。但实际上，在斯宾诺莎哲学中Potentia和Potestas的关系是一个蔚为复杂问题。从《伦理学》到《政治论》，斯宾诺莎都在追问权力的本质——Potestas非但不与Potentia对立，相反，它只是一种现实化的、结晶化的力量。这种力量兼具方向性与可控性，构成了Potentia的延伸。可以说，从来没有彻底“野蛮的”力量。重新配置权力的内部关系，破译其不同面孔，有助于我们反思当代激进左翼的本体论基础，并探索斯宾诺莎与马克思所代表的社会批判理论的全新接合点。权力本身是内在的，但它总是会经历一场复杂且漫长的变形。

10 April / 4月10日
Zhichen Tan 谈知辰
' How do evolutionary debunkers know we are mistaken?'

Chair主持嘉宾:Zhao Bin（赵斌）Abstract: According to evolutionary debunking arguments, our moral beliefs are mistaken for we hold them because of evolutionary forces, independent of the truth of these beliefs. In this talk, I will defend debunking arguments against a dilemma. It has been argued that to judge whether our moral beliefs are mistaken, debunkers must know some more truths and yet, they cannot know these truths because all of our moral beliefs are influenced by evolutionary forces and, thus, dubious. More specifically, the alleged dilemma can be cast as follows: debunkers either do, or do not, make assumptions such as “‘pain is bad’ is true”. If they make such assumptions, then moral realists will use these assumptions to show that we are not mistaken; if, by contrast, debunkers do not make such assumptions, then they cannot conclude that we are mistaken. In this talk, I will argue that debunkers can know we are mistaken without knowing any true moral belief. This is because it is a coincidence that our moral beliefs successfully track moral truths, which provides debunkers with good reason to say we are mistaken.本次报告将以英文进行，以下是中文版题目和摘要标题：演化拆穿论者如何知道我们出错了？摘要：演化拆穿论证指出，我们受演化影响而形成道德信念，而演化与这些信念的真无关，因此我们的道德信念出错了。在本次报告中，我将反驳针对拆穿论证的一个两难困境。有人认为，要判断我们的道德信念是否出错，拆穿论者必须知道一些真的道德信念，然而，他们无法知道这些真信念，因为我们所有的道德信念都受到演化影响，因而是可疑的。这里出现了两难困境：拆穿论者要么假设诸如"'痛苦是不好的'为真"，要么不做假设。如果他们做出假设，那么道德实在论会利用这些假设来证明我们没有出错；相反，如果拆穿论者没有假设，那么他们就不能说我们出错了。在本次报告中，我将论证拆穿论者可以在不知道任何真的道德信念的情况下知道我们出错。这是因为，如果我们的道德信念成功追踪真，这将是一个巧合，这为拆穿论证提供了好理由说我们错了。

Abstract**: Akrasia, in the contemporary discussions of action theory and moral psychology, is described as acting against one’s all things considered (ATC) best judgment. Given that ATC best judgment is a mental state, akrasia is also considered a psychological failure in that the akratic agent fails to follow it. In this talk I attempt to challenge this view of akrasia as merely a psychological failure by providing a counterexample to the thesis that akrasia is action against one’s ATC best judgment. The counterexample is taken from the so-called Aristotle’s inverse akrasia argument according to which foolishness combined with akrasia is virtue. I argue that the akratic agent’s ATC best judgment should also be the all-out best judgment whose content is about the ethical good. Hence, akrasia is not just a psychological failure but an ethical failure as well.本次报告将以英文进行，以下是中文版题目和摘要标题：不自制是伦理失败吗？——基于亚里士多德对不自制论述的回答摘要：在当代行动哲学和道德心理学文献中，不自制被描述为违背“行动者能考虑到的所有情形下的”（ATC）最佳判断的行动。ATC最佳判断是一种心理状态，因而不自制也被认为是一种心理失败，因为不自制行动者未能成功根据它行动。在这个报告中，我试图挑战把不自制仅仅作为心理失败的论点。我会提供一个来自亚里士多德的“反向不自制”的论证，即愚蠢加不自制是美德，并把它作为不自制是ATC最佳判断的行动的反例。我论证不自制行动者的ATC最佳判断也应当是全面的最佳判断，它的内容是关于伦理善好的。因此，不自制不仅是心理失败也是伦理失败。

24 April / 4月24日
Wenqi Li 李文琪
' Is Akrasia an Ethical Failure? —— An Aristotelian Response'

8 MAY/ 5月8日
Kai Zheng郑开
早期哲人如何思考无穷？
How did ancient philosophers think about infinity?

Chair 主持嘉宾: Meng Qingnan 孟庆楠摘要: 早期思想史如何思考无穷、无限是一个棘手且令人着迷的问题。有证据表明，哲学时代前后已经开始酝酿无穷、无限观念，形成了比较复杂的思想脉络。诸子时期的哲人诉诸循环往复讨论无穷、无限和永恒等问题，有比较明确的天文知识（天道）基础，同时沿着时、空两方面不断拓深。其中道家（老庄）和所谓名家（惠施）的思考尤其耐人寻味：道家（老庄）把无穷和无限归之于“无”，因而具有特别广阔的理论意义；名家（惠施）和辩者则在物理和逻辑的意义上探寻“名”“物”关系，同样涉及了普遍性和无限性等问题，且引发了具有深刻理论意义的悖论。古希腊人思考无限则以数学为范例的理论思考。

22MAY/ 5月22日
Shaohua Li 李少华
如何高效、顺利、圆满地筹办一场学术会议？

Chair 主持嘉宾: WANG Yanjing 王彦晶摘要:首先, 需要掌握学校有关举办学术会议的规章制度，对不同类型会议的审批手续、接待规格、财务报销等做到充分理解。其次, 把握好筹办会议的各个环节，包括：会前——邀请函寄发，住宿、会议室和餐饮预定；会期——参会人员的迎送接待，会期议程实施；会后——宣传报道、财务报销。其中，掌握财务报销规定和住宿餐饮预定尤其重要。The presentation will be in Chinese.Title: How can we efficiently, smoothly, and successfully organize an academic conference?

在《爱弥尔》第一卷，卢梭对婴儿权力欲的分析具有重要的哲学意义，可视作自爱与自尊、自然与社会之辩在婴儿身上的缩影，其中的关键是婴儿如何试图运用哭泣这种“自然语言”来试图命令和支配大人；而在《论人类不平等的起源和基础》中，卢梭对语言的起源进行了分析，这份分析也涉及从自然到社会的人性“发展”问题。本文试联系上述两个重要的文本段落，阐述卢梭如何论述语言的权力维度，以及这份论述的人性论与政治哲学意义。The presentation will be in Chinese. Below are translations of the title and the abstract.Title: 'Rousseau on the Origin of Language and the Infant's Desire for Power'
Abstract: In the first volume of Émile, Rousseau's analysis of the infant's desire for power is of great philosophical importance. This desire can be considered as the epitome of the debate between self-love and self-esteem, between nature and society in the infant. The key here is how the infant attempts to apply the "natural language" of crying to command and dominate the adult. Similarly, when analyzing the origin of language in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau discusses the "development" of human nature from nature to society. This paper seeks to establish a connection between these two important passages as part of an attempt to explicate Rousseau's account of the power dimension of language and the significance of this account for both his theory of human nature and his political philosophy.

11 Oct / 10月11日
CAI Zhenyu 蔡震宇
'A Religion of Law？ al-Ghazālī’s Reconstruction of Islamic Ethics'

Islam is often seen as the so-called "religion of law," contrasting with Christianity, which is regarded as the "religion of love" or "religion of grace." This distinction stems from the Christian tradition and has strongly influenced the perception of Islam among Orientalists and some Muslim intellectuals in the 19th and 20th centuries. In summary, Islam is considered a legalistic religion because either (a) it is law-oriented, as demonstrated in the sharīʿa traditions, or (b) the ethical spirit of mainstream Islamic theology can be taken as a form of Divine Command Theory. This talk aims to challenge the notion that Islam is essentially a legalistic religion by examining how al-Ghazālī, arguably the greatest theologian in classical Islam, reconstructed the ethical framework of Islam. I will demonstrate that (b) presents an oversimplified and distorted view of mainstream Islamic theology. Therefore, the legalistic interpretation of Islam, which is partially based on misunderstandings of Islamic theology, should be reevaluated.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：律法的宗教？论安萨里对伊斯兰伦理的重构
摘要：伊斯兰教常常被视为所谓的“律法的宗教”，以此相对，基督教则被视作“爱的宗教”或“恩典的宗教”。这一区分源自基督教传统，于19世纪至20世纪，强劲地塑造了东方学家和一匹穆斯林知识分子对伊斯兰的观看方式。概言之，视伊斯兰为律法宗教的原因有二：（a）它以sharīʿa传统为导向，或者（b）主流伊斯兰神学的伦理精神乃神命论。本次报告旨在挑战律法宗教这一概念化伊斯兰的方式。通过考察古典伊斯兰时期最重要的神学家安萨里对伊斯兰伦理框架的重构，我将展示神命论解读实为对主流伊斯兰神学的简化和扭曲。由此，部分地基于神命论构建的律法宗教叙事也应当被重新审视。

25 Oct / 10月25日
Zhao Bin 赵斌
'Virtue, Luck, and Safety'

According to robust virtue epistemology, a belief amounts to knowledge if and only if the subject believes the truth because of the exercise of cognitive ability. It has been argued that the satisfaction of the virtue condition does not suffice for the elimination of knowledge-precluding luck. Therefore, robust virtue epistemology falls short of anti-luck epistemology. Drawing on the idea that cognitive success depends on ability and luck in a gradient way rather than a rigid way, it is argued in this paper that knowledge is achieved just in case cognitive success sufficiently depends more on ability than on luck in the sense that the exercise of cognitive ability significantly enhances the modal profile of the target belief relative to the modal profile of a belief in the target proposition formed by sheer luck. Robust virtue epistemology understood in this way is also a kind of anti-luck epistemology because the satisfaction of the virtue condition ensures a kind of safety condition which, in turn, helps to eliminate luckily true beliefs from the realm of knowledge.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：德性、运气与安全性
摘要：根据强健的德性认识论，信念构成知识，当且仅当该信念之所以为真是因为认知能力的使用。有人认为，德性条件的满足不足以消除阻碍知识的运气。因此，强健的德性认识论并不是一种反运气认识论。在本文中，我将论证认知成功是取决于信念还是运气是一个程度问题。在此基础上，我还将论证，如果认知成功更多地依赖于能力而不是运气，即认知能力的使用显著地增强了目标信念的模态强度，那么该信念就构成了知识。这样一来，强健的德性认识论可被视作一种反运气认识论，因为德性条件的满足确保了一种安全性条件，而该安全性条件反过来又有助于消除阻碍知识的运气。

8 Nov / 11月8日
Bokai Yao 姚博凯
'Abstraction principles and size of reality'

Abstract: Frege distinguishes between objects and concepts: a horse is an object that falls under the concept of being a horse. Abstraction principles establish a certain correspondence between objects and concepts. Frege’s Basic Law V, for instance, claims that every concept is associated with an object—-its extension—such that two concepts are equivalent just in case they have the same extension. Hamkins recently showed that ZF set theory proves Fregean abstraction principles. But a more natural framework for investigating abstraction principles is set theory with urelements, where reality includes objects from any category—both sets and non-sets. In urelement set theory, however, abstraction principles are contingent upon how many urelements there are.以下是中文版标题和摘要。
标题：抽象原则与实在的大小
摘要：弗雷格区分对象与概念：马是一个符合“马”概念的对象。抽象原则旨在确立对象和概念之间的对应规则。例如，弗雷格的基本法则五提出，每个概念都对应一个对象，即其外延，等价概念同外延，同外延概念则等价。Hamkins近期观察到ZF集合论证明了弗雷格的一般抽象原则。但研究抽象原则更自然的框架是包含了各类对象的无素集合论。然而，在无素集合论中，抽象原则之成立系于无素之寡众。

22 Nov / 11月22日
QINGHE xiao 肖清和
'明末清初天主教对“朝闻道夕死可矣”的诠释及其意义'

摘要：《论语》中的“朝闻道，夕死可矣”，在不同时代的不同注释中有不同的解释。一般文史著作与经学著作对其解释也存在着较大差异。晚明天主教入华后，采取了附会古儒、跳出宋明儒家的解释，而使用西方天主教资源对古儒经典及其术语进行新的诠释。本文以“朝闻道，夕死可矣”为中心，梳理不同注释家的诠释以及明清天主教的再诠释，以期探讨在文明互鉴视角下，中西文化在核心术语层面的理解、诠释与再诠释。The presentation will be in Chinese. Below are translations of the title and the abstract.Title: Catholic Reinterpretation on Confucian Thoughts in Ming and Qing: Focus on “If you hear the truth in the morning, you can die in the evening” by Confucius.Abstract: The phrase “If you hear the truth in the morning, you can die in the evening” in the Analects of Confucius has been interpreted differently in the various commentaries through historical times. There are also great differences of the interpretations of this phrase between the historical works and the scripture works. After the Catholicism in late Ming dynasty came to China, it went back the ancient Confucian texts and used Western Catholic resources to make a new interpretation, while neglected the interpretation and comments by Neo-Confucianism in Song and Ming dynasties. In this paper, we focus on the phrase “If you hear the truth in the morning, you can die in the evening”, sort out the interpretations of different exegetes and the reinterpretations of Catholicism, in order to explore the understanding, interpretation and reinterpretation of Chinese and Western cultures at the level of core terms in the perspective of mutual appreciation of civilizations.Chair: Shangyang Sun 孙尚扬

24 May / 5月24日
Zhu Xiaomin 朱效民
'Communication with Taiji masters: different paradigm and choice'

Based on more than a dozen years of learning and communication with folk masters of traditional Taijiquan, I will show or rediscover a quite different picture of Taijiquan, which has been affected, ignored and misunderstood, or, I would like to say, distorted by modern science and Western sports to such a degree and for many years. Traditional Taijiquan in fact pays more attention to harmonious and integrated personal/practical feelings of yourself and relations with others/environment, and not only almost has no so called objective and unified rules or standards, but these rules often conflict with or even deny each other. However, with “sympathetic comprehension”, maybe because of this, the traditional Taijiquan could provide an alternative paradigm and various choices to see the world, to recognize yourself and understand the competition with others again, which are completely different from Western science and sports, and could also shed enlightenment on the latter.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：传统太极拳的交流：不同的范式与选择
摘要：传统太极拳长期以来受到现代科学与西方运动的影响、忽视、误解甚至曲解，在多年学习和交流的经验基础上，我将试图展示出传统太极拳的本来面目。传统太极拳更注重个体实践的整体感受，以及相互关系的和谐调整，几乎没有所谓客观和统一的规范或标准，而且不同门派之间的理念经常会相互冲突，甚至彼此否定。但也正因为与西方科学及运动规则之间存在的显著差异，基于“同情的理解”，我们会发现传统太极拳可能会显示出一种不同的范式以及多元的选择，使我们能够重新看待世界、认识自己、理解彼此，并对现代科学和运动提供有价值的参考。

10 May / 5月10日
Ge Jianqiao 葛鉴桥
'Can human intelligence understand other intelligence?'

Human brains have evolved to primarily handle social interactions within their own species, with little selection pressure for comprehending other intelligence for a significant period of time. Today, however, the emergence of artificial intelligence poses the question of whether human minds are capable of understanding and communicating with other intelligence. In this discussion, we will explore the possibility for human minds of comprehending intelligence from different carriers and intelligence in various forms.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：人类智能能理解其他智能吗?
摘要：随着人类的大脑的进化，人类已经能够处理自己物种内部的社会互动，在相当长的一段时间里，在理解其他智能方面选择压力也很小。然而，今天，人工智能的出现提出了这样一个问题，即人类的思想是否能够理解并与其他智能进行交流。在该讨论中，我们将探讨人类心灵在理解不同载体和不同形式的智能的可能性。

26 Apr / 4月26日
Lucy Jiang 蒋凡一
'The ambiguity of the world and the representational theory of perception'

Ambiguous stimuli are sensory stimuli that can be interpreted in multiple ways. For example, the famous duck–rabbit picture can be seen either as a duck or as a rabbit. Perception of ambiguous stimuli has been regarded as special due to its shifting nature. In this talk, I argue that perception of ambiguous stimuli and that of non-ambiguous stimuli are located on a continuum. The world as it is experienced by us is ambiguous to a certain extent. I further discuss one specific source of ambiguity: the ambiguity of what a given visual stimulus represents. Identifying this kind of ambiguity will help representationalists about perception to respond to some alleged counterexamples, whilst preserving the simplicity of their original theory. I will demonstrate this using the diamond–square picture, a widely discussed counterexample to the representational theory of perception.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：世界的模糊性与知觉的表征理论
摘要：模糊刺激指那些能够被以多种方式解读的感觉刺激。比如，著名的鸡兔图可以被看作一只鸡，或者一只兔子。对模糊刺激的感知因其变化的特点，通常被视作是特别的。在本次报告中，我希望论证对于模糊刺激的知觉与对非模糊刺激的知觉处于同一个连续统上。在某种程度上，我们所经验的世界是模糊的。我将继续讨论一种具体的模糊性来源：特定视觉刺激表征对象的模糊性。识别这种模糊性能够帮助关于知觉的表征主义者回应一些可能的反例，同时保留原有理论的简洁性。我将通过一个广受讨论的反例，即正菱形/正方形图形，来证明这一点。

12 Apr / 4月12日
Li Minzhe 李民哲
'Syntactical Facts and Mathematical Relativism'

The seemingly determinate and non-relative facts about syntax (e.g. PA proves 1+1=2) have long been regarded as a threat to Carnapian mathematical relativism, the view that mathematical truths are only true relative to a certain framework. A typical Carnapian answer to this challenge is to say that syntax belongs to the realm of applied mathematics (mathematics applied to physics, economics, etc.) rather than pure mathematics, and hence indeed admits determinate factual contents. In this talk, I show that consistency (and more generally, soundness), as a specific kind of syntactical facts, points to a potential difficulty to the Carnapian approach to syntax. In particular, Carnapians will need to answer to the possibility of an absolute notion of mathematical truth suggested by Feferman's completeness theorem with respect to iterated reflection sequences of arithmetical theories. Possible solutions will also be explored.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：句法事实与数学相对主义
摘要：句法往往被认为是一种确定性的、非相对的事实（例如，PA证明了1+1=2），因而也被认为是对卡尔纳普式的数学相对主义（数学真理只是相对于某一特定框架为真）的一种威胁。卡尔纳普主义对此的典型回答是，句法属于应用数学而非纯数学领域, 因此确实可以具有确定性的事实内容。在本次报告中，我试图说明理论的一致性以及更一般的可靠性，作为一类特定的句法事实，指向了卡尔纳普主义处理句法问题上的潜在困难。特别地，Feferman关于算术理论的迭代反身序列的完备性定理，向我们揭示了一种基于句法的绝对数学真理的可能，因而威胁了相对主义的基本立场。我也将进一步探讨卡尔纳普主义者可能的回应方案。

29 Mar / 3月29日
Caterina Ludovica Baldini
'The Rage of the Emperor'

Among the Stoics, Marcus Aurelius offers a unique portrayal of anger: Its presence is pervasive in the Meditations. Whereas previous Stoics focus on the theory and the proper punishment of anger, Marcus Aurelius seems to often draw on his personal interactions with all sorts of people that he met in his colossal empire. Indeed, his personal inclination to anger and his political status shaped his philosophical work in a unique way. After reading the Meditations we are left with one question: how easy was it really to anger the Stoic Emperor?本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：皇帝的盛怒
摘要： 斯多葛学派中，马可·奥勒留对“愤怒”有一番独特的描述，这在其代表作《沉思录》中也有充分的体现。此前，斯多葛学派一直专注于对愤怒适当惩罚的理论化研究，而马可·奥勒留则借助于自己在庞大帝国中与各类人的交往实践，生动阐述其对“愤怒”的理解。由此可见，他个人的易怒的倾向与他的政治地位以一种独特的方式共同塑造了他的哲学作品。读完《沉思录》，我们只剩下一个问题: 激怒斯多葛派皇帝到底有多容易?

15 Mar / 3月15日
Sebastian Sunday (王小塞)
'Realism Tout Court'

There exist all kinds of realisms about particular subject matters (moral, modal, scientific, etc.). I want to argue instead for a particular realism about all kinds of subject matter. In doing so, I will draw on an important but neglected line of development in the analytic tradition of philosophy, reaching from Frege and Russell to Wittgenstein and Kripke. Building on the latter two, I shall first argue that rigid designators are the real names; then, using the notion of nonrigidly bounded concepts, I will argue that all words have the potential of becoming real names.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：普遍实在论
摘要：目前存在着各种各样关于特定主题的实在论（道德的、模态的、科学的等）。然而，我想要提出一种关于各类主题内容的特殊的实在论思想——普遍实在论。在此过程中，我将为大家介绍一条在以往的哲学分析传统（从弗雷格和罗素，一直延伸到维特根斯坦和克里普克）中重要但却易被忽视的发展路径。在后两者的基础上，我将首先强调严格指示词是真正的名称；然后，我将借助于非严格界限的概念，论证所有语词都有潜力成为真正的名称。

2 Nov / 11月2日
Wang Yuzhou 王昱洲
'Social Robots and the Problem of Deception'

Social robots, broadly speaking, are robots that are designed to be perceived as social entities. However, our current technology is not mature enough to create actual social entities that have consciousness or feelings. Thus, many have argued that social robots are morally problematic because they are deceptive, especially in a harmful way. In this paper, I argue that social robots do not deceive people. Instead, the creators of the social robots take advantage of the cognitive limitations of the human mind and facilitate a sort of misunderstanding that can be either beneficial or harmful.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：社交机器人与欺骗问题
摘要：社交机器人指的是以被当作社会实体为目的而设计的机器人。然而，我们目前的技术并没有成熟到能够创造出真正的具有意识与感官的社会实体的程度。因此，很多学者认为社交机器人存在道德问题，因为它对人造成了具有伤害性质的欺骗。本文将论证社交机器人并没有对人类造成欺骗。社交机器人的创造者仅仅是利用了人类心灵的认知局限性，促成了一种既可能有利也可能有害的误解。

27 Apr / 4月27日
Li Silong 李四龙
'从“怪力乱神”说起 '

“怪力乱神”通常被解作四个词，我喜欢解成两个词“力”和“神”。宗教徒膜拜的是“神”还是神所拥有的“力”？“神”能否与“力”完全合体？一神教把神描绘成全知全能，但在中国传统宗教里，并没有这样的神。“力”有多种形态，中国人注重社会层面的力量，西方人以“科学”分解了上帝的力量。不能与力完全合体的神，无法成为社会的组织者，但能从教育上施展其影响。因此，教育家和宗教家存在一定的竞争关系，宗教的最主要领地是社会教育而不是超自然力量。理解中国的宗教现象，应重点考察文神关系而不是人神关系。在中国，文化形态决定宗教生活。The presentation will be in Chinese. Below are translations of the title and the abstract.Title: 'Discussion from "Guai Li Luan Shen"'
Abstract: The term "Guai Li Luan Shen" is usually interpreted as four separate words, but I prefer to interpret it as two words, "force" and "gods". Is it the "gods" or the "force" possessed by the gods that the religious worship? Can "gods" and "force" be fully combined? Monotheism portrays God as omniscient and omnipotent, but in traditional Chinese religion there is no such being. There are various forms of "force", the Chinese focus on social forces, whereas Westerners break up the force of God with "science". Gods, which cannot be fully combined with force, are not the organiser of society, but can influence people on the aspect of education. There is therefore a certain competition between educators and religionists, and the primary domain of religion is social education rather than supernatural force. In order to understand the phenomenon of religion in China, we should examine the relationship between the gods and culture rather than the gods and human. In China, forms of culture determine religion.

20 Apr / 4月20日
Ouyang Xiao 欧阳霄
'Rethinking Aesthetic Experience in Light of Chinese-Western Comparative Everyday
Aesthetics'

There is a bifurcation between shenghuo meixue and everyday aesthetics – the two discourses often seen as forming the same trend in contemporary aesthetics concurrently happening in the East and the West. The disparity can be observed from the critical reflection on everydayness, the recognition of negative aesthetic qualities and experience, and the expectation of defamiliarisation. I suggest that in the Neo-Confucian practice of gewu or investigating things, one may find another Chinese inspiration for dealing with the familiar, ordinary, and routine aesthetically. Gewu
offers another possibility of “experiencing the ordinary as ordinary”. It can lead to an aesthetical immersive experience, characterised by a sensuous and intuitive recognition of the appropriateness of everyday things dwelling in their contexts, as well as a cosmic understanding of generative power of the universe that is both profound and poetic. By contemplating aesthetic experience facilitated by gewu, I argue that aesthetic experience is typically not individual per se, but collective in the sense that many prima facie private and personal aesthetic experiences are possible only because of the collective underneath.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：从中西比较日常生活美学重思审美经验
摘要：审美与日常美学之间存在着一种差异--这两种论述通常被认为是形成了当代美学中，同时发生在东方和西方的一种相同的趋势。这种差异可以从对日常性的批判性反思、对负面的审美品质和经验的认识以及对陌生化的期待中观察到。我认为，在新儒家的 "格物"（gewu），或对事物的考察中，人们可以找到另一种中国式的灵感，来用美学的方法处理熟悉的、普通的日常。格物提供了另一种 "将日常体验为日常"的可能性。它可以导致一种美学上的沉浸式体验，其特点是对日常事物在其环境中的适当性的感性和直觉的认识，以及对普遍的生成力的理解，它既深刻又有诗意。通过思考由 "格物 "促成的审美经验，我认为，审美经验通常不是个别的，而是共同的。在这个意义上，许多表面上的个人的审美经验只因为共同的根基而可能。

13 Apr / 4月13日
Luo Shiman 罗诗曼
'The Contingency Requirement on Informativeness'

In this talk, I present an argument against the Contingency Requirement on Informativeness (CRI), the claim that a declarative sentence 𝑠 is informative iff 𝑠 individuates at least some but not all possible worlds. Since CRI is the conceptual motivation behind Floridi’s theory of strongly semantic information, the argument leads us to reflect on his particular conception of semantic information and, more generally, any classical conception of semantic information.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：关于信息量的偶性要求
摘要: 在本次讨论中，我提出一个论证来反对关于信息量的偶性要求。这个要求是说，一个陈述句𝑠是有信息量的，当且仅当𝑠能区分出一些但非全部的可能世界。由于这一要求是Floridi的强语义信息理论背后的概念动机，这个论证也使我们反思Floridi对于语义信息的概念化，以及更普遍的，任何经典的对于语义信息的概念化。

6 Apr / 4月6日
Wang Zhongjiang 王中江
'为什么是“意外”？理性、无知与控制和自由 '

在人的活动中为什么有的境遇被认为是意外的境遇，在人的行为中为什么有的结果被认为是意外的结果。这两者同人类对意外的定义是什么关系，同人的意图、理性、设计和控制是什么关系，同人的无意识、非意图、无知和自由是什么关系。已有的追问、相关回答和争论，有着将视域和论域单纯化、单一化的缺陷。对意外概念的扩展，对复杂性论域的引入，将会使意外解释的版图得到一定改观。The presentation will be in Chinese. Below are translations of the title and the abstract.Title: 'Why Is It an "Accident"? Reason, Ignorance, Control, and Freedom'
Abstract: Why are certain situations in human activities considered accidental situations? Why are some outcomes in human behavior considered accidental outcomes? What is the relation between these two questions and our definition of 'accidents'? How do they relate to intention, reason, design, and control? How are they related to unconsciousness, non-intention, ignorance, and freedom? The drawback of the existing inquiries, answers, and debates is that they have simplified and homogenized the perspectives and the domain of arguments. Expanding the concept of 'accidents' and introducing complex domains will change the map of the interpretations of 'accidents'.

22 Dec / 12月22日
Yu Xiaohui 余晓辉
'How Teleosemantics Can Accommodate Reliable Misrepresentation'

Recently, tracking theories of mental representation, and teleosemantics in particular, have been challenged on the ground that they cannot accommodate the possibility of reliable misrepresentation. Among others, Mendelovici, inspired by colour eliminativism, has argued that colour representations may, in fact, reliably misrepresent which, if true, would present a challenge to teleosemantics. In this presentation, I defend teleosemantics against this charge by arguing that (1) conceptual colour representations, which have the concept of colour as their content may reliably misrepresent but their content can be decomposed into more primitive constituents that are veridical and are explicable by teleosemantics; (2) non-conceptual colour representations cannot be reliable misrepresentations because if there were no, and never had been, colours, they would be attributed another content and hence remain veridical. I also respond to what motivates her argument, namely, a general worry that teleosemantics precludes certain irrealism, by providing four situations in which teleosemantics can accommodate the irrealism of what we prima facie represent.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：目的论语义学如何容纳稳定错误表征
摘要: 近来，关于心灵表征的追踪理论，尤其是目的论语义学，受到了有关它们无法容纳稳定错误表征的可能性的质疑。在众多质疑者中，Mendelovici受到了颜色取消主义的启发，论证说颜色表征可能事实上是一种稳定的错误表征，而这如果为真，就会对目的论语义学构成挑战。在本次报告中，我将针对这一指控辩护目的论语义学。我将论证（1）以颜色的概念为内容的概念化颜色表征可能稳定地错误表征，但它们的内容可以被分解为更原初的构成要素，这些构成要素是被正确表征的并且可以被目的论语义学所解释；（2）颜色的非概念化表征不可能是稳定的错误表征，这是因为假使颜色未曾存在，这些表征会被归属另一些内容，并由此保持其为真性。我还将给出四种情形，其中目的论语义学均能够容纳看起来被我们所表征的对象的非实在论，从而对Mendelovici论证的动机，即对目的论语义学提前排除了一些非实在论可能性的忧虑给出了一个回应。

15 Dec / 12月15日
Zhong Shengyang 钟盛阳
'Quantum States: An Analysis via the Indiscriminability Relation'

This talk consists of two parts. In the first part, I will present my summary of the main research paradigm of a field usually called mathematical foundations of quantum theory. In my opinion, this paradigm is a formal method of analysing concepts in a theory. In the second part, as an example of this paradigm, I will briefly present my analysis of the indiscriminability relation between the states of a quantum system. This includes a mathematical theorem which formalizes the folklore that the superposition principle is what distinguishes quantum physics from classical physics.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：量子系统的状态：一个基于不可分辨关系的分析
摘要: 本报告由两部分组成。在第一部分，我将总结一个通常被称为“量子理论的数学基础”的研究领域的主要研究范式。我认为这个范式是用形式化工具分析理论中的概念的方法。在第二部分，作为这个研究范式的一个例子，我将简单介绍我对量子系统状态之间的不可分辨关系的分析。其中，我将会用一个数学定理来说明，正如公认的那样，叠加原理是量子物理不同于经典物理的唯一特征。

8 Dec / 12月8日
Wang Xijia 王希佳
'“天地境界” 与“启示境界”的对话 '

冯友兰先生在其关于人生哲学原理的著作《新原人》（1942）中阐明了四种人生境界，即自然境界、功利境界、道德境界、天地境界，而以天地境界为人生的至高境界。在论及天地境界时他多次谈到对一神论宗教的认识，并认为人由宗教所得的境界只是“近乎”天地境界。在此将冯先生语焉不详的“近乎”展开，以马丁·布伯论述“关系世界”中通往“永恒之你”的启示境界为例，探析启示境界与天地境界的三点不同，即启示境界的异象性、救赎性、关系性与天地境界的觉解性、世间性、一体性，探究跨信仰理解的宗教学路径。The presentation will be in Chinese. Below are translations of the title and the abstract.Title: 'A Possible Dialogue between the Transcendent Sphere and the Revelational Sphere'
Abstract: Prof. Dr. Feng Youlan clarified the four spheres of living in his book The New Treatise on the Nature of Man (1942). According to different degrees of understanding and self-consciousness, there are the Innocent Sphere, the Utilitarian Sphere, the Moral Sphere, and the Transcendent Sphere. In discussing the highest sphere—the Transcendent Sphere—he repeatedly talked about his understanding of the monotheist religion, and he thinks that the religious spheres are only “close” to the Transcendent Sphere. I take on his term and compare it with Martin Buber’s sphere of Revelation, which is a sphere to the Eternal Thou in the relational world. There are three differences between the Revelational Sphere and the Transcendent Sphere, and this could be a method of cross-faith understanding in religious studies.

1 Dec / 12月1日
Zheng Xingfei 郑行飞
'A Third Kind of Action Explanation'

I propose to articulate a third kind of action explanation beyond the traditional ones discussed in the literature. I first argue it is not reducible to the traditional ones by constructing some scenarios which can possibly show its significance. Then I will show its deeper philosophical significance by contrasting it with traditional modes of action explanation by its role in uncovering one central presupposition in action explanation: action explanation goes by referrring to the temporal schema of its unfolding in time, which composes two aspects: a anticipatory one, and a retrospective one.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：一种可能的新的行动解释？
摘要: 我试图在报告中提出一种新的行动解释，它不同于文献中常探讨的两种行动解释。文献中常探讨的两种行动解释均是通过一个整体行动解释一个部分行动，而我提出的这种行动解释则是通过一个整体行动的其他部分来解释某个部分的解释。这种解释包含两个方面：未来导向的（用后一部分解释在做的部分）与回溯导向的（用做过的部分解释在做的部分）。我首先通过设想某些场景，论证它不能还原为传统的行动解释，以此展示它的独特意义。然后我会继续说明这种行动解释的独特的哲学意义在于：行动解释总是需要参照行动的时间框架，而回溯导向的行动解释展示了这一必要的参照的常被忽视的一面：在行动在时间中展开时，我已经完成的部分，也能帮我定位在整个行动中的位置，并可有意义地对当下行动进行解释和辩护。

24 Nov / 11月24日
Arthur Schipper
'Properties, Ontology, and Language'

In this short 10-minute talk, I introduce the audience to what serious ontologists should say about linguistic arguments for the existence of properties that employ nominalisations of predicates. I first briefly sketch (or summarise) the approach that I favour and then compare it to an approach one might articulate when looking at the work of one of the most important but unfairly ignored women philosophers (and logicians) of the 20th century.

17 Nov / 11月17日
Roger T. Ames (安乐哲)
'“Zoetology 生生论:” A New Name for an Old Way of Thinking'

The classical Greeks give us a substance ontology 本体论 grounded in “being per se” (to on he on) that guarantees a permanent and unchanging subject as the substratum for the human experience. With the combination of eidos and telos as the formal and final cause of independent things such as persons, this substratum or essence includes its purpose for being, and is defining of the “what-it-means-to-be-a-thing-of-this-kind” of any particular thing in setting a closed, exclusive boundary and the strict identity necessary for it to be this, and not that. In the Yijing 易經 we find a vocabulary that makes explicit cosmological assumptions that are a stark alternative to this substance ontology, and that provides the interpretive context for the Confucian canons by locating them within a holistic, organic, and ecological worldview. To provide a meaningful contrast with this fundamental assumption of on or “being” we might borrow the Greek notion of zoe or “life” and create the neologism “zoetology” 生生论 as “the art of living.” This cosmology begins from “living” itself as the motive force behind change, and gives us a world of boundless “becomings:” a contrast between an ontological conception of human “beings” and a process conception of what I will call human “becomings.”本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：“Zoetology” (生生论)：传统思想的新名称
摘要: 古希腊思想家提出了基于 “存在本身”（to on he on）的实体本体论。这种本体论保证了永久不变的主体，以作为人类经验的基底。这种基底或本质，以eidos和telos作为包括人的独立对象的形式因和目的因，包含了其存在的目的。这种基底也通过界定一种封闭、排他的边界以及对于“成为此物而非他物”所必需的严格同一性，定义了任何特殊对象的“何以为此物”。在《易经》中，我们找到了一种词汇，该词汇做出了与这种实体本体论截然不同的宇宙论假设，并且通过把儒家经典置于一种整体、有机、生态的世界观中，为其提供解释。为了与对on或“存在”的这一基本假设进行有意义的对比，我们可以借用古希腊的zoe观念（生命），创造出“zoetology”（生生论）这个术语，即“生命的技艺”(the art of living)。这一宇宙论源自于作为变化原动力的“生命”本身，并给予我们一个无止境的“成为”的世界。这对比了人的“存在”的本体概念 “human being”和我所称的人的“成为”的过程概念 “human becomings”。

27 Oct / 10月27日
Sun Anni 孙安妮
'Does Disability Make a Person Worse off?'

Many scholars in disability studies argue that disability does not make a person worse off. For instance, the mere-difference view, proposed by Elizabeth Barnes, holds that disability is a neutral trait with regard to a person’s overall well-being. This view is supported by the social model of disability, which, unlike the medical model, highlights social factors that (according to this model) cause a disadvantage of disabled people. However, Barnes’ view faces two criticisms: (1) If disability is a neutral trait to well-being, then it will be morally impermissible to remove or cure disability; (2) If disability is a neutral trait to well-being, then it will be morally impermissible to compensate disabled people due to their disadvantaged position. In this talk, I will provide a capability-based understanding of disability and use this as an alternative model to defend the mere-difference view.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：残障是否使人的境况变得更糟糕？
摘要：许多残疾研究的学者认为，残障并不会使一个人的境况变得更糟糕。例如，由Elizabeth Barnes提出的“单纯差异观点”认为，就一个人的整体福祉而言，残障是一个中性特征。这一观点得到了残障的社会模式的支持，与残障的医学模式不同，它强调是社会因素导致残疾人处于不利地位。然而，Barnes的观点面临两个批评：(1)如果残障是对福祉的中性特征，那么消除或治愈残障在道德上是不允许的；(2)如果残障是对福祉的中性特征，那么由于残障人士的弱势地位而对其进行补偿在道德上是不允许的。在这次演讲中，我将提供一种基于能力的对残障的理解，并将其作为一种替代模式来捍卫关于残障的单纯差异观点。

20 Oct / 10月20日
Peng Feng 彭锋
'Betweenness and Twofoldness: An Intercultural Interpretation of the Aesthetic Appreciation of Paintings'

In general, what we appreciate in painting is either its medium or its object, whether the object is an actual thing, a fictional thing, an internal emotion, an abstract idea, or something else. However, the conceptions of “betweenness” in traditional Chinese aesthetics and that of “twofoldness” in contemporary Western aesthetics hold that what we experience in a painting might be neither the object nor the medium, but rather a relation between them. Our understanding, evaluating, and aesthetic appreciating the picture most likely results from the cooperation of our awareness of the object and the medium, and further from the play of our mind and body.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：“之间”与“双重性”：对绘画审美的一种跨文化阐释
摘要：一般而言，我们在绘画中欣赏的，是绘画的媒介或者对象，无论这种对象是实物、虚构物、内在情感、抽象观念或其他对象。但是，根据中国传统美学的“之间”以及西方美学的“双重性”概念，我们在绘画中体验的，既非对象也非媒介，而是两者的关系。我们对图像的理解、评价和审美，很可能源自我们对媒介和对象的意识的协作，也来自于我们身体和心灵的游戏。

13 Oct / 10月13日
Ding Yifeng 丁一峰
'The Modesty Puzzle'

It seems extremely natural to suspect that something we believe is in fact false. After all, there is no shortage of memories of admitting mistakes. However, according to a classic theory of belief, it is necessary for us to believe that everything we believe is true. In the past, I have used this observation to motivate an alternative formal semantics for belief and a weaker logic of belief with propositional quantifiers, but as a recent paper by Jeremy Goodman points out, the logic may not be weak enough, because even in the alternative semantics, being modest: believing (not just suspecting) that something we believe is false, comes with the price of inconsistency. In this talk, I will mainly try to present carefully why it is so difficult to be modest in these theories of belief, and then offer some very preliminary thoughts on the apparent difficulty.本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。标题：谦虚难题
摘要：怀疑我们的某些信念其实是错的是一件特别自然的事情。毕竟我们从不缺少承认错误的记忆。然而，根据一种经典的信念理论，必然地，我们相信我们所相信的所有都是真的。此前，我基于这个观察提出了另一种信念的形式语义以及一个更弱的包含命题量词的信念逻辑，然而Jeremy Goodman的一篇新近文章指出这个更弱的逻辑可能还不够弱，因为即便在这另一种形式语义下，保持谦虚，也即相信（而不只是怀疑）有某个我们相信的事情其实是错的，的代价是不一致。在这次报告里，我将主要小心地展示为何在这些信念理论中保持谦虚是如此困难，然后我将提供一些关于这种困难的初步想法。

22 Sept / 9月22日
Shang Xinjian 尚新建
'问诊“历史主义” '

2012年百年系庆，王博教授将北大哲学系的特色和传统概括为注重哲学史的研究和积淀。本次导引报告根据哲学的性质和当代哲学的发展趋势，对我系的这一传统评头论足，诉其利弊，辩其得失，试图疏解哲学与哲学史之间关系的困惑，以期引起重视和讨论。The presentation will be in Chinese. Below are translations of the title and the abstract.Title: 'A Talk on “Centering on the History of Philosophy”'
Abstract: At the 100th Anniversary of the Philosophy Department of Peking University in 2012, Prof. Wang Bo described the Department’s tradition as “centering on the history of philosophy”. This talk will criticize this tradition in terms of the nature of philosophy and the contemporary developments of philosophy, and it will discuss the advantages and the disadvantages of the tradition, refusing the confusion of philosophy with the history of philosophy. This talk aims at drawing more attention and discussion to this question in the Department.

23 Jun / 6月23日
Sun Ningyuan 孙宁远
'Altering Spacetime: The Nature and Contingency of Fundamentality'

Combinatorialism is the idea that in fundamental reality, metaphysical possibility and logical consistency coincide. In this talk, I discuss whether facts about fundamentality (such as that “temporal metric is fundamental”) themselves are necessary or contingent under Combinatorialism. To do this, I first carve reality into fundamentals, reducibles, and irreducibles (using higher-order and first-order resources). Then I present four accounts of nature of fundamentality (according to which fundamentality itself is in turn fundamental, reducible and irreducible), and canvass what kinds of contingency about fundamentality each account licenses. I come to the conclusion that either every (non-)fundamental thing is necessarily (non-)fundamental, or everything both could be fundamental and could be non-fundamental. Throughout this talk, I use four spacetimes from mathematical physics as concrete examples upon which discussions about modality and fundamentality unfold. I also explore connections between structure, symmetry in philosophy of physics and fundamentality, structuralism in metaphysics along the way.
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16 Jun / 6月16日
Zhao You 赵悠
'Time as Power: Notes on A Grammarian's Theory of Time'

Bhartṛhari, a 5-6th century grammarian and philosopher, treated the nature of time (kāla) in his magnum opus Vākyapadīya (On Sentence and Word) III.9. He alluded to various schools of thoughts, and criticized their different theories of time. He proposed that time is sequenceless one and is the efficient cause of all in this world. In this presentation, I shall introduce Bhartṛhari’s theory of time against the backdrop of his philosophical agenda, so as to show how a monist deals with divisions of time, especially different tenses.
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9 Jun / 6月9日
Fang Bo 方博
'社会福利的康德式论证 '

当代政治哲学有两个显著的特征：一是在方法论上康德要素的重新激活，二是在主题方面社会正义或社会福利原则越来越被关注。这最为鲜明地体现在罗尔斯及其追随者的理论中。但在康德自己的论述中存在着对福利原则的明确的拒斥，因此如何在康德的语境内重新论证社会福利原则便成为了当代康德研究中的一个热门主题。本次报告将指出当前各种重构方案所存在的问题，并尝试给出一个替代性的方案，在为社会福利的必要性辩护的同时，阐明社会福利的限度。The presentation will be in Chinese. A translation of the title is as follows: 'A Kantian argument for social welfare'
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2 Jun / 6月2日
Shi Lingzhi 史凌志
Limited knowledge of one’s margin for error

The KK principle, one of the iteration principles in epistemology, claims that if you know that p then you know that you know that p. Timothy Williamson raises a counterargument against this principle in his 2000 work, by showing that combining KK principle with two other plausible principles, the closure principle and the margin for error principle, will lead to contradiction. However, in this talk I will point out that Williamson’s argument against KK can not apply to a particular type of epistemic agent who is partly ignorant of (or only has limited knowledge of) his margin for error. Also, this type of epistemic agent is not excluded from the principles presupposed by Williamson. This consequence will lead to a loss of theoretical virtue of Williamson’s argument, since Williamson is intended to demonstrate that it is a structural limitation for human knowledge that KK principle is not valid.
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26 May / 5月26日
Zhan Yiwen 展翼文
'Metasemantic Twin Earth and Advanced Conceivability'

The talk begins with the case of the apparent possibility of a 'Metasemantic Twin Earth', with which our sentences may receive crazy yet consistent interpretations that are no less eligible than the non-crazy ones. According to David Chalmers, such Twin Earth is only prima facie, but not ideally, conceivable for a rational conceiver. But mightn't a rational conceiver have a different set of metasemantic ideals to strive for? Some recent scholars—most notably Shamik Dasgupta—see no reason to say no. Call this kind of conceivability 'advanced conceivability'. I aim to discuss and evaluate the implications of advanced conceivability: e.g., whether (or in which sense) it is arbitrary, whether (or in which sense) it can be used to derive dualism, etc.
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19 May / 5月19日
Sui Tingting 隋婷婷
'Autonomous driving and moral algorithms in the age of artificial intelligence'

Autonomous vehicles are accompanied by many moral disputes in algorithm. Trolley dilemma is one of the most crucial moral dilemmas. Among moral algorithm, utilitarianism, as most acceptable choice, is the most expected algorithm. However, in a survey conducted by Bonnefon, it‘s the most preferred choice, but seldom people showed interest in autonomous vehicles with it. Was the purchase situation a trigger for the moral preferences, or was the morality independent of the selection? Whether the utilitarian preference can be the basis of algorithm design? And according to the free will theory does autonomous vehicle have the right to make moral judgment? We set up several experiments to deal with these questions. In the within group comparison, we found that morality and choice preferences were not always linked. While in EEG experiment, we discussed timeline of reaction time and brain wave latency. According to these experiments, we thought the future direction of driverless vehicles' ethical algorithm is likely to be a new algorithm such as Rawlsian algorithm and so on.
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12 May / 5月12日
Liu Yuanyuan 刘媛媛
'Are Intentions Even Required for Omissions to be Intentional?'

The topic of omissions, especially intentional omissions has drawn more and more attention from philosophers, but this term has been used by them in a pretty dispersive way, e.g., Ginet and Clarke disputing on how to spell the kind of intentions required for omissions to be intentional. It is not a new struggle for philosophers, the cases of intentional actions share the same issue. Namely, the relationship between intentions and actions that we call intentional has never reached a consensus and remains debatable. For instance, it is rarely self-explanatory that when we state intentional actions, whether we imply the actions that are done precisely out of intentions, or those that are done knowingly. Things got trickier in cases of omissions, due to its mysterious nature of never occurring. In some of the cases that people commonly deem as intentional omissions, an intention to not act might never be generated by the agent, which leads us to the following question: Are intentions even required for omissions to be intentional? In a short answer, I propose to defend for a strict view of the intention condition, which applies to both cases of intentional actions and omissions.
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28 Apr / 4月28日
Liu Chang 刘畅
'语言解释的伦理 '

报告为中文The presentation will be in Chinese. Below are a translation of the title and an abstract.Title: 'Toward an Ethics of Interpretation'
Abstract: What are the fair interpretations of what someone says? Questions like this belong to what I call the "ethics of interpretation," and they are often at the center of many controversies. For example, many public figures complain that their comments are taken "out of context" or interpreted "unfairly." Despite the recent focus on the normative issues of language, this question has not received enough discussions in philosophy of language. This paper lays the foundation of an ethics of interpretation by making two contributions. First, it surveys three possible answers to the question and raises arguments against them. Second, it develops a contractarian theory of ethics of interpretation, i.e., an interpretation is fair when it would be chosen by a hypothetical hearer who is ignorant of his identity in a "linguistic original position." I will also show its implications on legal philosophy and social philosophy of language.
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14 Apr / 4月14日
Wang Yanjing 王彦晶
'Hintikka meets Plato: an epistemic adventure of Ǝ▢ '

In this talk, I will survey some of my recent work involving the bundle modality that packs an existential quantifier Ǝ and a modality ▢ together. In the epistemic setting, this modality merges the definitions of knowledge in different traditions and is actually the key to the formal treatment of the de re knowledge expressed by knowing how/why/what. Besides the mathematical advantages, the bundle modality also provides us a new looking glass through which we can discover surprising new connections, as demonstrated by applications to non-classical logic and AI.
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31 Mar / 3月31日
Yang Xuegong 杨学功
'如何理解爱因斯坦的 “宗教感情 ”？'

报告将运用哲学解释学方法，集中阐释爱因斯坦1930年10月在Forum and Century（《论坛和世纪》）第84卷193—194页发表的一篇短文《我的信仰》（What I Believe，又被译为《我的世界观》）中的如下一段话：“我们所能有的最美好的经验是神秘的（mysterious）经验。它是坚守在真正艺术和真正科学发源地上的基本感情。谁要是体验不到它，谁要是不再有好奇心（wonder）也不再有惊讶的感觉（awe，惊异感），他就无异于行尸走肉，他的眼睛是迷糊不清的。就是这种神秘的经验——虽然掺杂着恐怖（fear，恐惧）——产生了宗教。我们认识到有某种为我们所不能洞察的东西存在，感觉到那种只能以其最原始的形式为我们所感受到的最深奥的理性和最灿烂的美——正是这种认识和这种情感构成了真正的宗教感情；在这个意义上，而且也只是在这个意义上，我才是一个具有深挚宗教感情的人。”The presentation will be in Chinese. A translation of the title is as follows: 'How to understand Einstein's religious feelings?'
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17 Mar / 3月17日
Nan Xing 南星
'智能和判断力 '

报告为中文The presentation will be in Chinese. Below are a translation of the title and an abstract.Title: 'Intelligence and Judgment'
Abstract: In The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle launches an attack on the traditional theory of the intellect, which he calls "the intellectualist legend", and then offers an innovative account of the nature of intelligence. Perhaps somewhat ironically, it will be shown that some of Ryle's insights are already anticipated by Kant, who, despite his strong commitment to the core tenets of the traditional view, recognizes the deficiency of this view and endeavors to amend it with his doctrine of (the power of) judgment. An interpretation of Ryle's theory of intelligence and Kant's doctrine of judgment in light of each other will reveal interesting similarities as well as important differences between them, and also deepen our understanding of the nature of intelligence and judgment as such.
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23 Dec / 12月23日
Julius Schönherr
'Doxastic Justification as Control'

In this talk, I will argue, first, that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement; i.e. sometimes a belief is doxastically justified although it is not based on a reason. And yet, second, both notions – basing and doxastic justification – are intimately related: a belief is justified as long as it is under the appropriate control of a reason. Such control, in turn, requires (among other things) that a belief that is not presently based on a reason would, in the relevant circumstances, be based on it. In the final section of my talk, I will suggest that my account has exciting consequences when applied to other rationally evaluable attitudes such as the emotions.
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9 Dec / 12月9日
Lu Qiaoying 陆俏颖
'目的论语义信息与温和的基因决定论 '

报告为中文The presentation will be in Chinese. Below are a translation of the title and an abstract.Title: 'Teleosemantic information and a moderate version of genetic determinism'
Abstract: According to modern biology, a biological trait or phenotype is produced by the interaction between genes and the environment. However, the intuition of genetic determinism (that genes determine phenotypes) is still lingering. My talk will defend a moderate version of genetic determinism by analyzing the gene concept in terms of information. There are two distinct meanings of information, namely, correlational information and semantic information. From a purely developmental perspective, a gene carries correlational information about the phenotype such that the genes do not have a fundamentally unique role compared to environmental factors. While from the evolutionary perspective, a gene carries teleosemantic information encoded by natural selection in the past such that it currently presupposes a corresponding phenotype. This presupposition relation underlies our intuition that genes, in a weak sense, 'determine' the phenotype.
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25 Nov / 11月25日
Chi Zeyu 池泽钰
'Event Dependence and Determinism'

History consists of a chain or web of particular events which are causally dependent on one another in a complicated way. There is an intuitive sense that history thus understood is contingent: numerous things could have been otherwise so that we don’t get the exact chain or web making up our actual history. What does the intuition tell us about the dependence relation between particular historical events? The counterfactual analysis of dependence doesn’t seem to do us any good here. Nor is the regularity model that it sets to replace of any help here. (Nor is the covering law model of explanation for this matter, given the obvious reason that history, like medicine, concerns itself with particular causal chains or webs.) A better alternative, I argue, is to accept indeterministic dependence between events. The proposal has an implication for our thinking of the determinism thesis in the free will literature: there is little reason to believe that determinism accurately describes the relation between particular events once we accept that (most? all?) dependence between historical events is genuinely indeterministic.
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11 Nov / 11月11日
Han Linhe 韩林合
'康德区分开了理由与原因吗？'

后期维特根斯坦所做出的最为独特的哲学贡献是将理由与原因严格地区别开来。正是基于这个区分，他对遵守规则现象及语言现象的本性做出了独特的说明。此区分不仅在维特根斯坦后期哲学中居于核心的位置，而且也在当代哲学特别是道德哲学和行动哲学的讨论中占有着一个非常重要的位置。在我看来，维特根斯坦是哲学史上第一个明确地做出这种区别的哲学家。不过，这个断言与一些哲学史家的观点相背。比如，著名康德专家艾利森（Henry E. Allison）声称，康德在其著名的理知因致性学说或自由学说中就已经做出了——至少应该做出了——维特根斯坦意义上的理由与原因之分。我认为这种解读是错误的。The presentation will be in Chinese. Below are translations of the title and the abstract.Title: 'Does Kant make the distinction of reason and cause?'
Abstract: One of the most important philosophical contributions made by the later Wittgenstein is to distinguish reason from cause. On the basis of this distinction, he discussed the rule-following and the nature of language. This distinction plays a central role not only in Wittgenstein's philosophy, but also in contemporary discussions on issues in moral philosophy and philosophy of action. On mine mind, Wittgenstein is the first philosopher in history who makes the distinction. But some philosophers don't think so. For example, Allison, one of the most important experts in Kant, claims that Kant already made, or at least should have made, this distinction in his doctrine of intelligible causation. I shall argue that this is a completely wrong interpretation of Kant's doctrine.
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